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Article 4(10) of the World Bank Articles of Agreements (hereafter 
referred the World Bank Charter) adopted in 1944 prohibits World Bank 
staff from taking political factors into account in their operations and 
loans decisions for projects of development. Article 4(10) has been at the 
heart of a sound debate that is reviewed in this paper in relation to human 
rights and corruption. The discussion is a step further of the colloquium 
referred as the “Justice and Development Week” organised in November 
2010 by the World Bank Legal Vice Presidency Law held in 
Washington- USA. The purpose of that international meeting was to 
examine the political prohibition clause in International Development 
Finance. One of the issues raised during the seminar was the 
interpretation of the World Bank Charter particularly its Article 4(10).
 
 
This article discusses the matter and focuses mainly on major issues of 
the political clause: First, the historical reasons of the insertion of the 
political prohibition clause in the World Bank Charter and the 
arguments in support of as well as in opposition to such a restrictive 
approach by the Bank to engaging with corruption and human rights 
issues. Second, an analytical discussion of the Bank’s economic 
perspective and exclusive definition to corruption followed by the legal 
discrepancies of such a regime of sanctions in comparison with those set 
by UN and AU anti-corruption conventions.  
Keywords: International Agencies, Articles of Agreement, Political 
prohibition clause, Fight against Corruption.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 careful examination of the World Bank Group’s purpose 
shows as a general rule, a deep interest for that 
organisation to remain a key International Financial 
Institution (IFI).
 1
 Established in 1944 after the World War II, 
the aim of the World Bank
2
 was to help finance the 
      _____________________________________________________ 
*      LL.B, LL.M, PhD Fellow. 
1
       The World Bank Group includes the International Bank for Reconstr-   
         uction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Asso     
         -ciation (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Mul- 
         tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International  
         Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
2
        The World Bank is composed by two organisations: The International   
         Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Interna-  
         tional Development Association (IDA).  
A 
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reconstruction of Europe and the economic development of 
its erstwhile colonies and a few independent states in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America.
3
 With 189 Member States today, the 
World Bank is still working to achieve the purpose
4
 of: 
assisting countries, promoting foreign investments and 
growth, arranging loans and conducting its operations so as to 
generate productivity
5
 within these countries. The World 
Bank Charter also referred as Articles of Agreements, further 
stipulates that, in less developed countries, the Bank’s purpose 
is “to [encourage] the development of productive facilities and 
resources”.
6
 In order to achieve these objectives, there are 
some guiding principles that have been defined in the Articles 
of Agreements so as to direct the decisions of the Bank 
operating within the realm of those goals set by Article 1. In 
this perspective, and as one of the strongest principles, the 
Bank’s Charter [obliges the Bank staff to consider merely 
economic factors in their decisions] prohibits Bank staff from 
interfering in the political affairs of its Members States and 
from taking political considerations into account in its 
operations.    
That principle, the so-called political prohibition clause, is 
primarily defined in Article IV Section 10 of the World Bank 
Charter. It literally states that: “the Bank and its officers shall 
not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall 
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned.  
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed 
impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article 
1”.
7
   
      _____________________________________________________ 
3
      IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I, available at: https://www.wor  
       ldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of agreement. 
4
     Article 1 of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developm- 
      ent (IBRD) Charter. 
5
     The words “productivity”, “productive facilities”, “productive purpo- 
 ses” and “productive resources” appear several times in the first article 
 of the IBRD Charter.   
6
     Article 1 (i) of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop 
      -ment (IBRD) Charter.  
7
     This provision of Article IV Section 10 is accentuated by Article III, se 
       -ction 5(b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement which provides equally    
       that “the Bank’s loan proceeds must be used only for their intended pu 
       -rposes and “with due attention” to economy “without regard to politi- 
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This article addresses the legal implications of the 
implementation of Article 4(10) of the World Bank Charter. 
It discusses the matter and focuses mainly on major issues of 
the political clause with respect to the fight against corruption 
in particular. After this introduction, section 2 exposes the 
historical reasons of the insertion of the political prohibition 
clause in the 1944 World Bank Charter and the arguments in 
support of as well as those advanced in opposition to such a 
restrictive approach by the Bank in dealing with corruption 
and/or human rights issues. Section 3 provides an analytical 
discussion of the Bank’s exclusive economic perspective and 
inadequate definition of corruption. This is followed by the 
legal discrepancies of the Bank’s regime of sanctions against 
corruption in comparison with those set namely by UN and 
AU anti-corruption conventions. Section 4 provides some 
recommendations on how to address the negative effects of 
Article 4(10) of the World Bank Charter.  Section 5 is the 
concluding section.  
2. THE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR 
ARTICLE 4(10) OF THE WORLD BANK 
CHARTER 
Before engaging the discussions and problems raised by the 
political prohibition clause of the World Bank operations in 
light of achieving its purposes, it is important to recall on one 
hand, the historical background of this specific legal provision 
by revisiting the reasons behind the drafting of such a 
prohibition in the Bank’s Charter. Also, it will also be 
important to analyse and understand, the arguments against 
such a provision related to the Bank’s operations. The World 
Bank Charter was drafted and adopted in 1944. The founders 
of the Bank were factually influenced by the political, 
economic, philosophical, and geopolitical environment that 
prevailed at that specific time. Hence, they wanted the World 
Bank to be efficient and serve the purposes attached to its 
creation. The major sequential arguments in support of the 
Bank’s political prohibition clause are as follows: 
 
      _____________________________________________________ 
       cal or other non-economic influences or considerations”.  
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2.1 The idea that political prohibition provides the Bank      
more efficiency as a result of the confidence it has in 
the advantages of capitalism 
The confidence in capitalism is referred as one of the strongest 
reasons to justify the importance of the political prohibition 
clause within the Bank. This is based on the asserted fact that 
the economic performance of a State does not automatically 
depend on its democratic status. In this line, the Bank has 
always believed that economic freedom is the solution for its 
expansion and efficiency as an International Financial 
Institution. Generally, the Bank has focused exclusively on the 
economic dimensions of development, operating in a 
globalised capitalist market.  
According to Hassan Cisse
8
, the former deputy general 
counsel of the World Bank, the historical point about the 
confidence of the Bank in capitalism is taken from the speech 
of Lord Keynes at the Inaugural Meeting of the Bank and the 
Fund at Savannah (1946), where he stated that "if these 
institutions are to win the full confidence of the suspicious 
world, it must not only be, but appear, that their approach to 




As a result of this approach, the Bank has been able to 
remain one of the largest development financial institutions, 
providing technical assistance in developing countries and 
around the world. In fiscal year 2019 for example, the IBRD 
committed $23.6 billion and IDA committed 21.9 billion 
dollar for 351 new operations.
10
 The World Bank has 
redefined its mission in two goals: reducing the share of the 
global population that lives in extreme poverty to three 
percent by 2030 and increasing the incomes of the poorest 40 
      _____________________________________________________ 
8
      Hassan Cisse, ‘Navigating the Muddy Waters of Politics in Internati-  
       onal Development Finance – Should the Political Prohibition in Char-   
       ters of International Financial Institutions be revisited? The case of the   
       World Bank’, [2010] in report of The World Bank Legal Vice Presidency     
       Law, Justice and Development Week, 9th November 2010; siteresour-    
       ces .worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/.../HCissePresensentation_ 
       Nov7.ppt 
9
     As above. 
10
   Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report 
(accessed 24/10/2019).  
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per cent of people in every country. The World Bank loans 
and grants money for financial assistance worldwide. As from 
October 2018, the Bank’s website indicated that the amount 
of $45.9 B was spent for 12,000 projects to support 
development and relief in 189 member countries.
 11
 
The World Bank Group comprises five institutions 
managed by their member countries. It provides low-interest 
loans, zero to low-interest credits, and grants to developing 
countries. By doing so, it supports a wide array of investments 
in such areas as education, health, public administration, 
infrastructure, financial and private sector development, 
agriculture, environmental and natural resource management. 
Some of its projects are co-financed with governments, others 
with multilateral institutions, commercial banks, export credit 
agencies, and private sector investors.  
2.2 The idea that the political prohibition prevents the 
Bank from being an institution settling political 
disputes among its Member States 
This argument is also provided to justify the inclusion of 
Article 4 section 10 of the Bank Articles of Agreement. Hence, 
although the Bank is considered as a specialised agency of the 
United Nations, the political prohibition clause has been the 
basis under which the Bank has shaped certain issues such as 
human rights from its mandate. In this line, the Bank has 
generally been reluctant to fully consider human rights as 
promoted and protected by the UN as part of its own 
mandate. For instance, the Bank had carefully declined the 
invitation to take part in the drafting of the UN Convention 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. Similarly, the 
Bank had refused to follow the instructions of the UN 
Security Council to withhold assistance to the South African 
Apartheid Regime for its human rights violations
12
 as well as 
      _____________________________________________________ 
11
   As above. 
12
   See UN Doc A/AC09/124 (10 June1984), s.116. See also, ‘The Policies  
      of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa’ G.A. 
Res. 2054, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 16, U.N. 
Doc.A/6014 (1966) (recommending that economic sanctions be applied 
against South Africa due to its government's continuation of its 
apartheid policies). 
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For Hassan Cisse, this argument is taken from a paper 
prepared by the US Treasury in early 1944. That document 
explained the World Bank draft Articles of Agreement and 
addressed the issue of the political prohibition.  Following this 
broadsheet, the “political activities” are prohibited for the 
reason that the Bank did not want to be an institution for the 
settlement of political disputes with its Members. Hence, this 
restrictive approach has prevented the Bank to be an 
institution settling political disputes or using its loans as an 
instrument of political negotiation or pressure on States. 
Similarly, the Bank has continually argued that its work in 
non-democratic countries was vital because its mission was to 
help the poor regardless of the regime, and the 'worst' 





2.3 The idea that the political prohibition enables the 
Bank to function as an Impartial IFI, which has 
corporate structure and acts as a financial 
intermediary as it was designed for 
The need to separate the Bank from all kinds of political 
activities further emerged after the cold war between capitalist 
and communist countries. At the time of the Cold War, both 
the United States of America and Union Soviet Socialist 
Republic tried to obtain the dependability of developing 
nations through assistance, and recipients often held a degree 
of power in these negotiations. Fearing that rejected states 
would turn instead to communist countries for aid, the West 
propped up several totalitarian regimes in order to stabilise the 
political climate. Some more notorious examples include Chile 
under Pinochet, the Philippines under Marcos, Uganda under 
      _____________________________________________________ 
13
  G.A. Res. 2105, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014 (1965) on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, (requesting that all 
international institutions withhold assistance from the governments of 
Portugal and South Africa until they reverse their policies of racial 
discrimination and colonial domination). 
14
   R Ayres, Banking On The Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty 
(The MIT Press, 1983) 56. 
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Amin, Equatorial Guinea under Macias, and perhaps most 
famously, Zaire under Mobutu.
15
    
It was not only this unique political climate that 
encouraged both bilateral and multilateral donors to support 
authoritarian regimes. At the time, it was presumably evident 
that there were too many totalitarian regimes that were said to 
have greater economic performances than some “democratic” 
countries that faced severe economic challenges. Hence, the 
Bank decided to collaborate with countries that were 
considered as authoritarian.  
As the norm, rather than the exception, it is argued by the 
Bank that, donors were unlikely to take the nature of a 
political regime into account when distributing aid. If they 
did, there would indeed be few recipients to take advantage of 
aid.
16
 That is why, “the mandate of the Bank was designed to 
protect its reputation as a conservative, technocratic financial 
institution”.
31
 The impartiality of the Bank appeared to be one 
of its strongest values, which is the reason why in a nutshell, 
“political considerations [were] supposed to be irrelevant… 
especially as the Bank’s credibility and strength has 
traditionally depended on its status as a quintessential 




3 THE DEBATES SURROUNDING THE 
POLITICAL PROHIBITION CLAUSE 
OF THE BANK OPERATIONS 
One of the latest/rarest attempts by the Bank to provide 
clarification on the political prohibition clause was the 
“Justice and Development Week” organised in November 
2010 by the World Bank Legal Vice Presidency Law. The 
purpose of that colloquium was to re-examine and address the 
issue of the political prohibition clause in International 
Development Finance and on human rights.  
      _____________________________________________________ 
15
   A Hoogvelt ‘Globalisation and the Post-Colonial World: The New Po- 
litical Economy of Development’ (1997) 172  
16
   M Heather ‘The origins and development of the world bank’s anticorru- 
ption programme’ [2002] PhD thesis, Durham University, Department 
of Politics, 21; I Shihata ‘The World Bank in a Changing World’ [2000] 
165.   
17
  S George & F Sabelli ‘Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular 
Empire’ (1994) 50. See also, I Shihata ‘The World Bank in a Changing 
World: Selected Essays’ (1991) 10.   
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Some of the areas in which the political prohibition clause 
of the Bank has been challenged relates to the Bank relations 
with de facto Governments; the question of treatment of 
human rights; the Bank’s involvement in the security sector or 
criminal justice reform and the Stolen Asset Recovery 
Initiative. In order to achieve this objective, the Bank has to 
reconsider its restrictive approach and rather enter into new 
proactive ones with clear oversight and accountability 
mechanisms of its operations. Hence, it is important to note in 
this line that, over the course of its existence, the Bank has 
established several accountability and review entities with 
oversight over Bank operations and affairs. Unlike the Board 
of Directors or the President, these entities do not owe their 
existence to the Articles. In fact, the Articles are completely 
silent about them. Some of these entities were created under 
the President’s power to conduct the Bank’s ordinary 
business
18
, while others were established under the Bank’s 
implied powers.  
Some entities, notably the Administrative Tribunal, were 
established by the Board of Governors. Others, such as the 
Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Board, were created 
through Executive Directors’ resolutions or other decisions. 
Still others, like the Internal Audit Department or the 
Independent Evaluation Group, owe their existence to specific 
Management actions. However, despite improvement of the 
Bank operations with respect of human rights namely through 
the adoption of new operational policies
19
 as well as by 
establishing Expert Advisory Panels, the Bank engagements 
against corruption remain insufficient. 
Although the Bank has recently adopted policies and 
procedures against corruption, these policies are still quite 
      _____________________________________________________ 
18
   IBRD Articles, Article V, Section 5 (b) and IDA Articles, Article VI,   
      Section 5 (b). 
19
   Bank policies and procedures include inter alia the following:  the En- 
vironmental Assessment (O.D 4.01), Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4 
.15), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Pest Management (OP.4.09), Po 
-verty Reduction (O.D 4.15,  Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20), Forestry 
(OP 4.36), Disclosure of Operational Information (BP 17.50), Econo-
mic Evaluation of Investment Operations (OP 10.04), Project Monito-
ring and Evaluation (OD 10.70), Project Supervision (OD 13.05), and 
Management of Cultural Property in Bank financed projects (OPN 
11.03).   
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below the anti-corruption standards defined by African 
Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption 
as well as the United Nations Convention against corruption. 
The difference of standards between the Bank’s anti-
corruption policies and regional and international anti-
corruption conventions can be perceived at the level of both 
the definition and criminalisation of corruption. 
3.1 An economic rather than a political definition of 
corruption  
Most definitions relate corruption to the behaviour of a public 
official, who may be the object or the subject of corruption. 
Thus corruption is "an illegal payment to a public agent to 
obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the 
absence of payoffs" or "the sale by government officials of 
government property for personal gain".
20
 The benefit may 
not be financial or immediate, the public official may be 
appointed or elected, and the bribe may be offered or extorted.   
The Bank’s economic definition of corruption was earlier 
given by its former President Wolfensohn who said that the 
Bank decided to redefine the word corruption, regarding it as 
an economic, rather than a political matter. The Bank's 
position also has been around the idea that almost all human 
rights have economic implications and most economic issues 
involve a series of political calculations and considerations. 
Shihata had defined issues related to "the art and practice of 
running a country or governing," as "political", but he 
excludes "such typical economic and technical issues such as 
the 'management of money or the finances or more generally 
the efficient management of the countries' resources."
21
 For 
Shihata, “the issues at hand is simply to identify aspects of 
governance that are relevant to the Bank’s work and may 
therefore defensibly fall within its mandate, and aspects that 
      _____________________________________________________ 
20
   A Shleifer & RW Vishny, ‘Corruption’ [1993], The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 599-617.  
21
   Martha Heather ‘The origins and development of the world bank’s an- 
ticorruption programme’ [2002], PhD thesis, Durham University, De-
partment of Politics.   
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are clearly political considerations, which cannot be taken into 
account without breaching the Bank’s Articles [of 
Agreement]. Such identification will make it possible for the 
Bank to determine the governance issues it may formally take 
up in its dialogue with borrowing countries and appropriately 




The current World Bank policies and procedures on 
corruption, which evidently set an economic approach to 
corruption are:   
i. The Bank Directive: Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption in 
Bank Financed Projects,
23
   
ii. The Anti-corruption guidelines for World Bank guarantee 
and Carbon finance transaction,
24
  
iii. The Bank Guidelines on preventing and combating fraud and 
corruption in program for results financing,
25
   
iv. The Bank Directive: Guidelines on Preventing and Combating 
Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans 
and IDA Credits and Grants (revised as of July 1, 2016),
26
    




vi. The Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA 




The assessment of these Bank anti-corruption policies and 
procedures, which are all influenced by the Bank 
“organizational myth.”
29
 If compared with the standards set 
      _____________________________________________________ 
22
  See Ibrahim Shihata ‘the World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of 
the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements’ (1988) 46-47 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Politics.  
23
   https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/Dis- 
      pPage.aspx?docid=3871 (accessed on October 3
rd
 , 2018). 
24
   https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/Dis- 














  Ibid. 
 
29
   Martha Heather ‘The Origins and Development of the World Bank’s An- 
     ti Corruption Programme’ [2002] PhD Thesis, (83), Durham University,  
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by the AU and UN Conventions against corruption, it is clear 
that the Bank definition of corruption is a minimalist one and 
merely based on economic considerations.   
In this line and as an example, the Bank's Procurement 
Guidelines take a functional perspective, defining a corrupt 
practice as "the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of 
anything of value to influence the action of a public official in 
the procurement process or in contract execution." 
Similarly, the World Bank Guidelines on preventing and 
combating fraud and corruption in program for results-
financing address Fraud and Corruption that may occur in 
connection with the preparation and implementation of 
programs financed, in whole or in part, by the IBRD or the 
IDA through Program-for-Results Financing. They set out 
the general principles, requirements, and sanctions applicable 
to such programs. Nonetheless, following these Guidelines, it 
is clear that the Bank has an exclusive economic rather than 
political understanding of corruption. The Guidelines state 
that: “[t]he Loan Agreement
30
 providing for the Loan
31
 
governs the legal relationships between the Borrower
32
 and the 
Bank
33
 with respect to the Program
34
 for which the Loan is 
made. The responsibility for the implementation of the 
Program under the Loan Agreement, including the primary 
responsibility for preventing and combating Fraud and 
Corruption, rests with the Borrower. “The Bank, for its part, 
      _____________________________________________________ 
     Department of Politics.   
30
  References in the Guidelines to “Loan Agreement” include any Loan Ag- 
     reement providing for an IBRD loan; Financing Agreement providing for 
     an IDA credit or IDA grant; Trust Fund Grant Agreement or Loan Agre- 
     ement providing for a recipient-executed trust fund grant or loan in cases      
     where these Guidelines are made applicable to such agreement; and the  
     Program Agreement with a Program Implementing Entity related to any  
     of the above.  
31
  References to “Loan” or “Loans” include IBRD loans as well as IDA cr-  
    edits and grants, project preparation advances, and recipient-executed tru 
    -st fund grants or loans for programs to which these Guidelines are made 
applicable under the agreement providing for such grant and/or loan. 
These Guidelines do not apply to investment project financing (to which 
separate guidelines apply) or to development policy financing- 
32
   References in the Guidelines to “Borrower” include the recipient of an 
IDA credit or grant or of a trust fund grant or loan.  
33
    References in the Guidelines to the “Bank” include both IBRD and IDA.  
34
  Reference in the Guidelines to the “Program” means the Program as 
defined in the Loan Agreement.  
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has a fiduciary duty under its Articles of Agreement to make 
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used 
only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due 
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and 
without regard to political or other non-economic influences 
or considerations.”
35
 These Guidelines constitute an 
important element of those arrangements and are made 
applicable to the preparation and implementation of the 
Program as provided in the Loan Agreement.”
36
  
In the same perspective, other Bank policies on corruption 
provide additional definitions of practices constituting fraud 
and corruption. The Guidelines on preventing and combating 
fraud and corruption in program for results-financing define 
exclusive economic related practices with no reference to 
political or human rights dimensions of corruption. The 
practice defined by the World Bank policies is specifically: a 
“corrupt practice”.
37
 According to the Guidelines, typical 
examples of corrupt practices include bribery and 
“kickbacks”, a “fraudulent practice”
38





 and an “obstructive practice”
41
 as 
      _____________________________________________________ 
35
   Emphasis added. IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article III, Section 5(b) ; 
IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 1(g).  
36
   World Bank Guidelines on preventing and combating fraud and corru-
ption in program for results-financing, para 2 
65
 The World Bank, 




  A “corrupt practice” is defined as the offering, giving, receiving, or so-
liciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence impro-
perly the actions of another party.   
38
  A “fraudulent practice” is defined as any act or omission, including a 
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to 
mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an 
obligation.  
39
   A “collusive practice” is defined as an arrangement between two or more 
parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including to  influence  
improperly the  actions  of another party.  
40
   A “coercive practice” is defined as impairing or harming, or threateni-ng 
to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the 
party to influence improperly the actions of a party.  
41
   An “obstructive practice” is defined as (i) deliberately destroying, falsi- 
fying, altering or concealing of evidence material to the investigation or 
making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a 
Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive, or 
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practices only understood of constituting fraud and 
corruption within the Bank operations.   
The Anti-corruption guidelines for the World Bank 
guarantee and Carbon finance transaction provide the 
interpretation of each of the five prohibited practices of 
corruption. Among the five interpretations provided by the 
Bank, there are at least two interpretative issues to be 
addressed. First, following the Bank guidelines, Corrupt 
Practices are understood as “kickbacks and bribery. The 
conduct in question must involve the use of improper means 
(such as bribery) to violate or derogate a duty owed by the 
recipient in order for the payor to obtain an undue advantage 
or to avoid an obligation”.
 42
 The problem with this definition 
of Corrupt Practices is that the Guidelines provide an open-
ended and unclear exception which is that “antitrust, securities 
and other violations of law that are not of this nature are 
excluded from the definition of Corrupt Practices”.
43
This 
provision of “other violations of law that are not of this 
nature” basis of the exclusion of behaviours and actions 
excluded from the scope of the Bank’s definition of corruption 
needs to be clarified. The reason is the fact that the Guidelines 
have been drafted very explicitly so as to capture all reasonable 
practices to be considered as corruption. Equally, this 
provision is contracting with the legal principle requiring that 
one cannot be punished for doing something that is not 
prohibited by law known as nulla poena sine lege.
44
 
Secondly, the Bank guidelines further precise that 
“fraudulent practices are intended to cover acts or omissions 
that are directed to or against a World Bank Group entity. It 
also covers Fraudulent Practices directed to or against a World 
Bank Group member country in connection with the award 
or implementation of a government contract or concession in 
a project financed by the World Bank Group. Frauds on other 
third parties are not condoned but are not specifically 
      _____________________________________________________ 
collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any 
party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to 
the investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or (ii) acts intended 
to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of audit 
or access to information.  
42
  Anti-corruption guidelines for World Bank guarantee and Carbon fin-
ance transaction, para 1.   
43
   As above. 
44
   Latin expression for "no penalty without a law” 
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sanctioned in World Bank guarantee projects or carbon 
finance operations”.  
The problem arises as the Bank Guidelines further state 
that, “other illegal behaviour is not condoned, but will not be 
sanctioned as a Fraudulent Practice under the World Bank 
sanctions program as applicable to World Bank guarantee 
projects or carbon finance operations”.
45
 This provision is 
tantamount to nullifying attempts to address corrupt practices 
by the Bank. The Guidelines would have rather provided for 
a provision that encompasses all possible practices of similar 
nature as fraudulent practices instead of narrowing the 
possibility of qualifying and therefore sanctioning ‘other 
illegal behaviour’ that are not ‘condoned but will not be 
sanctioned”.  
3.1 Anti-corruption standards of the African Union and 
the United Nations  
However, it is inadequate to address corruption in Africa 
without linking it to political issues. Political scientists look 
beyond the visible signs of corruption to the broader setting 
in which it occurs.
65 
They see corruption in relation to the 
legitimacy of the State, the patterns of political power, and the 
engagement of civil society. Equally, as we argue, both the 
United Nations and African Union Conventions against 
corruption put an emphasis on the relevance of political 
aspects of combatting corruption and both give importance to 
the role of civil society to fight corruption.   
Corruption may also be a manifestation of the way 
political power is contested and exercised. Likewise, it is 
conceivably linked to the leadership, to the way the creation 
and allocation of State rents serves political purposes: such as 
rewarding supporters, buying off opponents, ensuring the 
backing of key groups, managing ethnic diversity, or simply 
accumulating resources to fight elections. To obtain these 
resources, leaders may forge alliances with business groups or 
create and distribute rents through the bureaucratic apparatus. 
The resulting policies may favour or discourage capital 
accumulation and economic growth, depending on the nature 
      _____________________________________________________ 
45
   Anti-corruption guidelines for World Bank guarantee and Carbon finan- 
      ce transaction, para 1 a. 
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Politicians in such countries may be 
aware of the distortionary consequences of such rents but 
view them as a necessary tool of political management. If this 
is the case, the pattern of corruption will change only if the 
power structure changes, which may result from a popular 
outcry against corruption. Over time most industrial 
countries have developed merit-based bureaucratic values, 
institutionalized competitive politics, established transparent 
government processes, and fostered an active media and an 
informed civil society. These mechanisms constrain political 
and bureaucratic corruption, making it the exception rather 
than the norm. 
In developing countries, in contrast, government 
institutions are weaker, civil society is less engaged, and 
political and bureaucratic processes are less accountable and 
transparent. An effective state apparatus and capacity for law 
enforcement may be virtually non-existent. In such settings, 
sustained progress in building an honest and effective state 
apparatus requires addressing the mix of factors in the state 
and in society that give rise to both corruption and weak social 
and economic performance. This is an exceedingly complex 
and long-term effort.
46
   
The Bank exclusive economic approach to corruption is 
not fully in line with the African Union Convention on 
preventing and combating corruption. The objectives of the 
Convention are to “promote and strengthen the development 
in Africa by each State party of mechanisms required to 
prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related 
offences in the public and private sectors”.
47
 The principles of 
the Convention set as follows: “States parties to [the] 
Convention undertake to abide by the following principles: 1. 
respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation the rule of law and good governance; 2. respect 
for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant 
human rights instruments; 3. transparency and accountability 
in the management of public affairs; 4. the promotion of social 
justice to ensure balanced socio-economic development; 5. 
      _____________________________________________________ 
46
  The World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of 
the World Bank, available at:  http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsec 
tor/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (accessed 1 May 2018). 
67    
See article 2 of the Convention.  
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The African Union Convention puts a strong emphasis on 
the role of civil society in combatting corruption. The 
preamble of the Convention states that: “[d]etermined to build 
partnerships between governments and all segments of the 
civil society, in particular, women, youth, media, and the 
private sector in order to fight the scourge of corruption …” 
Likewise, the United Nations Convention states in its 
preamble that: “[b]earing in mind that the prevention and 
eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all States and 
that they must cooperate with one another, with the support 
and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public 
sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations 
and community-based organizations, if their efforts in this 
area are to be effective…”.   
For the United Nations, the Convention against 
corruption is the culmination of the work that started many 
years ago, when the word ‘corruption’ was hardly ever uttered 
in official circles. It took systematic efforts, first at the 
technical, and then gradually at the political level to put the 
fight against corruption on the global agenda.
49
 Furthermore, 
the Convention recognizes the political causes but also the 
political consequences of corruption. It acknowledges the 
political threats that corruption may cause namely to fragile 
States. Even for the signing of the UN Convention, a political 
consensus of UN member States was atypically needed which 
was done at a “Political Signing Conference”. As educed in the 
Preamble of the UN Convention where the UN General 
Assembly recalls the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption was open[ed] for signature at the High-level 
Political Signing Conference [..] held in Merida, Mexico, from 




On the same note, both the United Nations and African 
Union Conventions address corruption at the political level, 
recognizing the importance of the empowerment of political 
      _____________________________________________________ 
68
   See article 3 of the Convention.  
49
   Preamble of the UN Convention. 
71
, article 9 of the AU anti-corruption 
Convention.  
50
  Preamble of the UN Convention against corruption paragraph num-
bered 2.  
The Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy    398 
entities such as the civil society and media in the fight against 
corruption. This is important as beyond the criminalisation, 
the UN and AU Anti-Corruption Conventions typically 
focus on preventive measures. For instance, the AU 
Convention obliges State parties to ensure the right of access 
to any information that may be required to assist in the fight 
against corruption.
66
 It further obliges State parties [to] agree 
to consult and seek the full participation of the media in the 
implementation of the Convention and to create an enabling 
environment that will enable the media and other civil society 
organizations to hold governments to the highest levels of 
transparency and accountability in the management of public 




In the same vein, these measures include transparency in 
the funding of political parties as well as the proscription of 
the use of funds acquired through illegal practices in the fight 
against corruption.
52
 According to these legal instruments, 
each State Party are to “consider taking appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures, […] with the fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, to enhance transparency in the 
funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where 
applicable, the funding of political parties.
53
 
Yet, the ways and means defined by the World Bank 
guidelines are clearly not to allow the Bank to take political 
factors into account in dealing with corruption. This political 
prohibition also sets disparities in anti-corruption efforts, 
different standards than those set by the anti-corruption legal 
instruments that create binding obligations on African States. 
  
3.2 Anti-corruption sanctions of the World Bank and 
the AU-UN Conventions  
The legal implications of the political prohibition clause of the 
World Bank can also be seen at the level of the sanctions for 
corruption. Both the UN and AU Conventions oblige State 
      _____________________________________________________ 
51
   See article art 12(1) (2) (3) (4) of the AU Convention 
52
   See article 10 of the AU Convention  
53
   See article 7(3) of the UN Convention  
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parties to take sanctions against corruption such as 
confiscation 
54
 or direct recovery of property.
55
  
Rather, the Bank Guidelines, shaped with the influence of 
the political prohibition, does not provide for a possibility of 
intervention of the Bank in case of corruption. The Guidelines 
rather indicate that Bank may or may not intervene in case of 
Fraud and Corruption that could occur in connection with the 
preparation and implementation of programs financed, in 
whole or in part, by IBRD or IDA through Program for-
Results Financing. The Guidelines state that: “[i]n furtherance 
of the above-stated purpose and general principles, except as 
otherwise agreed in writing by the Borrower and the Bank, the 
Bank: a- Promptly informs the Borrower of all credible and 
material allegations or other indications of Fraud and 
Corruption in connection with the Program that come to its 
attention, consistent with Bank policies and procedures; b- In 
cases where the Bank determines it necessary to do so to fulfil 
its fiduciary duty, may conduct an inquiry into such 
allegations or other indications, independently of or in 
collaboration with the Borrower; […] (d) May sanction
56
 any 
individual or entity other than the Member Country
57
 if at any 
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54
  The AU Convention defines confiscation as ‘any penalty or measure 
resulting in the deprivation of property, proceeds or instrumentalities 
ordered by a court of law following proceedings in relation to a criminal 
offence or offences connected with or related to corruption”.   
55
  The UN Convention compels States parties to “take such measures as 
may be necessary to permit another State Party to initiate civil action in 
its courts to establish title to or ownership of property acquired through 
the commission of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention; (b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its 
courts to order those who have committed offences established in 
accordance with this Convention to pay compensation or damages to 
another State Party that has been harmed by such offences”.  
56
   Sanctions include (but are not limited to) publicly declaring such indivi- 
dual or entity ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, 
to: (i) be awarded a Bank-financed contract; (ii) benefit from a Bank-
financed contract, financially or otherwise, for example as a subcon-
tractor; and (iii) otherwise participate in the preparation or imple-
mentation of the Program or any other project or program financed, in 
whole or in part, by the Bank. The Bank may publish the identity of any 
individual or entity sanctioned under subparagraph 7(d).  
57
   For purposes of these Guidelines, “Member Country” includes (i) offi- 
cials and employees of the national government or of any of its poli-tical 
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time the Bank determines that such individual or entity has 
engaged in fraud and corruption in connection with the 
Program or any other Bank-financed activity or is otherwise 
subject to sanction pursuant to its prevailing policies and 
procedures”.
58
    
This provision shows a non-political approach to 
sanctioning corruption by the Bank. The Bank’s approach to 
sanctioning corruption is predetermined by a condition: ‘if at 
any time the Bank determines that such individual or entity 
has engaged in fraud and corruption in connection with the 
Program or any other Bank-financed activity’. This 
precondition even if met, is not binding on the Bank to act 
promptly by sanctioning the individual or entity responsible. 
Furthermore, the Guidelines say the Bank ‘may’ sanction 
meaning the Bank ‘may not’ as well.  
In the same line, the Bank Guidelines state that the Bank 
‘may sanction’ only individual or entity other than the 
‘Member Country’. The Guidelines specifies that ‘Member 
Country’ that is excluded from the scope of the Bank 
sanctions includes ‘(i) officials and employees of the national 
government or of any of its political or administrative 




This provision is not in line with either the AU or the UN 
Anti-corruption Conventions. The two conventions set 
obligations to Member States to sanction corruption including 
against corrupt public officials. The Bank’s principle of 
excluding ‘public officials’ from the scope of the sanctions for 
corruption is not in line with the principles and procedures set 
by both the AU and UN Conventions. ‘Public officials’
59
 
      _____________________________________________________ 
or administrative subdivisions, and (ii) non-autonomous government 
owned enterprises.  
58
   See World Bank Guidelines on preventing and combating fraud and co- 
rruption in program for results-financing, paragraph 7  
59
    Following the UN anti-corruption Convention for example, “Public offi 
-cial” shall mean: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, admini-
strative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, 
whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective 
of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public 
function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides 
a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as 
applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other 
person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a State Party. 
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including foreign public officials’
60
 are targeted by the UN and 
AU Conventions and should be sanctioned in any case of 
corruption. Article 15 of the UN anti-corruption Convention 
for instance  states ad litteram that: ‘[e]ach State Party shall 
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally:  
(a)  the promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official 
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties;  
(b)  the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official 
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties’.   
Finally, the Bank’s anti-corruption Guidelines as drafted 
have conflicting provisions with the binding obligations on 
AU and UN member States to prevent and fight against 
corruption as defined by the AU and UN anti-corruption 
Conventions. These conflicting provisions have to be 
considered by the Bank, as the current cognitive and 
normative trends in International Development Law are to 
clearly define and set the nature and legal obligations of IFIs 
toespect, protect and fulfil international human rights.  
The UN Human Rights Council in its Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/34/3 recognised on one hand that 
“marginalized groups are at particular risk of suffering from 
the adverse impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human 
rights and on the other hand, highlighted that States shall […] 
endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed 
      _____________________________________________________ 
However, for the purpose of some specific measures conta -ined in 
chapter II of this Convention, “public official” may mean any person 
who performs a public function or provides a public service as defined 
in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area 
of law of that State Party.  
60
  Following the UN anti-corruption Convention, “Foreign public offi-
cial” shall mean any person holding a legislative, executive, administra-
tive or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elec-
ted; and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, 
including for a public agency or public enterprise.  
The Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy    402 
at the prevention of corruption and its impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights, and to periodically evaluate 
relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a 
view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight 
corruption, including by ensuring transparency, access to 
public information, accountability, non-discrimination, and 
meaningful participation in the conduct of public affairs”.
61
 
The HRC in the same resolution, equally welcomed the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development including its recognition 
of the need to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies that 
provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect 
for human rights, on effective rule of law, and on good 
governance at all levels, as well as on transparent, effective, and 
accountable institutions, and its addressing of factors that give 
rise to violence, insecurity, and injustice, such as inequality, 
corruption, poor governance, and illicit financial and arms 
flows. 
4 ADDRESSING THE NEGATIVE 
EFFECTS OF THE ARTICLE 4(10) OF 
THE BANK CHARTER 
Considering the above-identified legal issues related to the 
prohibition clause of the Articles of Agreements, there are 
multiple solutions or possibilities to address the problems 
raised. The World Bank can either amend its Articles of 
Agreement or interpret it in a more progressive way or 
teleological manner that would encompass all the existing 
conventional standards related namely in the international 
safeguard of human rights and mechanisms to fight 
corruption.  
As far as the Article 4(10) per se is concerned, this article 
provides two possible solutions or proposals with respect to 
addressing article 4(10) of the Bank Charter. The proposed 
solutions aim at allowing the Bank to better engage into 
corruption and human rights or related issues, which given 
their potential political nature, fall within the scope of the 
political prohibition clause. The proposed solutions are 
namely: the amendment of the Bank Articles of Agreement on 
one hand and the adoption of a teleological interpretation of 
the Articles of Agreement, which will allow the Bank 
      _____________________________________________________ 
61
   https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/35/25 (accessed 20/10/2019).  
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Executive Directors to adjust, regulate, fine-tune, correct and 
change the Bank policies in favour of issues that were excluded 
from its scope such as human rights and corruption. This is a 
necessary step to enable the World Bank to continue or better 
co-exist in a global economic and socio-political changing 
environment guided by sustainable development principles 
and goals based on a culture of human rights realisation and 
enjoyment by all.  
For the first proposed solution, the amendment of the 
Bank’s Charter, it is important to note that it is complex and 
to be challenging. The amendment procedure within the Bank 
is very strict and its members have rarely resorted to this 
option. The process of amending central provisions of the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement might be accompanied by 
attempts by shareholders to introduce other amendments and 
reshape the Bank’s mandate.
62
 The amendment procedure is 
defined by articles VIII of the IBRD Charter and VII of IDA 
Charter. It poses a precondition and sets a strict requirement 
to that effect. Article VIII of the IBRD Charter states that:  
“[a]ny proposal to introduce modifications in this 
Agreement, whether emanating from a member, a 
governor or the Executive Directors, shall be 
communicated to the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors who shall bring the proposal before 
the Board. If the proposed amendment is 
approved by the Board the Bank shall, by circular 
letter or telegram, ask all members whether they 
accept the proposed amendment. When three-
fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent 
(1) of the total voting power, have accepted the 
proposed amendments, the Bank shall certify the 
fact by formal communication addressed to the 
members.”  
Clearly to be amended, the IBRD Articles of Agreement has 
to be approved by the Board of Governors and be accepted by 
60 per cent of IBRD members holding 80 per cent of the total 
voting power. As pointed out by Cisse,
 
“considering that the 
political prohibition clause touches on an issue on which little 
consensus seems to exist among member countries, it is 
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62
   Hassan Cisse, (n 1 above), (22).   
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doubtful whether sufficient votes could be mustered to effect 
the requisite amendment”.
 63
 This restrictive process has only 
permitted the IBRD Articles of Agreement to be revised twice 
while the IDA Charter remains unchanged.
64
   
The second suggested solution is a teleological 
interpretation of article 4(10) of the Bank Charter in line with 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Nevertheless, the challenge to face is that when interpreting 
the Articles of Agreement, the Bank Executive Directors are 
not expected to act as a court of law. However, this does not 
mean that the Executive Directors may interpret the Articles 
of Agreement without any legal or policy constraints. Rather, 
they must interpret the Articles in accordance with principles 
of treaty interpretation and applicable policy requirements.
65
 
In particular, they must consider the requirements of 
effectiveness, reasonableness, good faith, and the Bank’s 
common interests and those of its members. In addition, in 
making a formal interpretation, the Board usually has the 
benefit of legal opinion on the subject from the General 
Counsel in interpreting its Articles, the Bank has generally 
adopted a teleological or purposeful interpretation. This 
technique has been followed because the Bank, as a 
multilateral institution, must nimbly respond to the changing 
needs of its members and the evolving concept of development 
itself.
66
 Hence, this technique is most suitable for international 
organizations since it enables them to adapt to a rapidly 
changing world.  By relying on this technique, the Bank would 
continue to be able to overcome certain textual anachronisms 
in its Articles that were no longer serving the institution’s 
objective.
67
 Moreover, through this process, Executive 
Directors may fill acknowledged gaps in the Articles to enable 
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   Hassan Cisse, (n 1 above), (83).   
64
   Hassan Cisse, (n 1 above), (83).  
65
   Vice President and General Counsel, “Interpretation” and the “Exercise 
of Implied Powers” in Respect of the Bank’s Standard Value (May 7, 
1985) at paragraph 4. 
66
    Andres Rigo Sureda, ‘The Law Applicable to the Activities of Internation 
     -al Development Banks’, (308) Recueil Des Cours 9, 157 (2004), see also, 
Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, ‘International Institutional 
Law: Unity within diversity’ 832-835 (844). 
67
   Ibrahim Shihata, ‘World Bank Legal Papers’ xxxix (2000) at lx. 
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the institution to fully pursue its objectives.
68
 At the same 
time, neither teleological interpretation nor any other 
technique can be abused to render illogical constructions of 
the written text. A Board interpretation, which seeks to amend 
the Articles or radically reshape the Bank’s institutional 
structure, is an unauthorized amendment that cannot pass 
legal muster.
69
 On this line, changes through interpretation, 
rather than amendment, cannot affect the fundamental 
features of an international organization’s charter.  
This is perhaps the process that has led the World Bank to 
initiate the Stolen Asset Recovery since 2007 based on a 
proactive appreciation of the scourge of corruption. The 
Stolen Asset Recovery is a joint initiative between the Bank 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). Set up in 2007, the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) 
Initiative focuses on helping developing countries recover 
assets stolen by corrupt officials and hidden in foreign 
countries. The StAR is a result of the proactive involvement in 
governance and anti-corruption by the World Bank from the 
early 1990s. As noted by Cisse, the Asset recovery often takes 
place in the context of a change of governments. This is just an 
exemplary initiative that shows the Bank can do much more 
to address the issue by preventing, detecting, punishing and 
eradicating corruption and related offences meeting hereby 
the same standards of both the AU and UN anti-corruption 
conventions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The above analysis shows that mending the existing 
mechanisms to address anti-corruption policies and 
mechanisms of International Financial Institutions in general 
and the World Bank Group in particular has been beneficial in 
improving governance practices. In the Foreword to the UN 
Convention against Corruption, former UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Atta Annan wrote that ‘corruption is an 
      _____________________________________________________ 
68
   Vice President and General Counsel, “Interpretation” and the “Exercise 
of Implied Powers” in Respect of the Bank’s Standard Value (May 7, 
1985) at paragraph 4.  
69
   IAD, ‘Terms of Reference’ [2005] and Senior Vice President and Group 
      General Counsel, Legal Memorandum on Board Involvement in Senior 
Appointments, COGAM2007-0016 and PC2007-0014 (June 6, 2007), at  
paragraph 4. 
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insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on 
societies.’
70
 The World Bank Group considers corruption a 
major challenge to its twin goals of ending extreme poverty by 
2030 and boosting shared prosperity for the poorest 40 per cent 
of people in developing countries. Yet corruption continues to 
hamper the efforts to meet the goals of ending extreme poverty 
and boosting shared prosperity.   
The Report of the African Union High Level Panel on 
Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, chaired by H.E Thabo 
Mbeki, former President of South Africa, in partnership with 
the United Nations Economic Commission revealed that 
Africa loses about 50 billion US dollars annually due to that.
71
 
Corruption has had a corrosive effect on Africa’s development: 
it has weakened public institutions, distorted resource 
allocation, and affected the quality and scope of the delivery of 
social services.   
The African Union Agenda 2063, under Aspiration 3 
recognizes that corruption erodes the development of a 
universal culture of good governance, democratic values, 
gender equality, and respect for human rights, justice and the 
rule of law. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development Goals, under Goal 16, calls on all countries to 
promote and develop accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels, notably, by reducing bribery and corruption. It is 
therefore important for International Financial Institutions 
such as the World Bank to align its procedures to the current 
global and regional anti-corruption standards.  
Following the African and UN anti-corruption 
Conventions, fighting corruption efficiently should include 
active and broad-based stakeholder engagement. The World 
Bank should invest more of its anti-corruption strategies in 
empowering citizens. It should also strengthen its new Expert 
Advisory Council on Citizen Engagement. The Bank’s 
increased collaboration with citizens in decision-making 
processes can make its decisions more responsive to citizens’ 
needs and improve the sustainability of program and project 
outcomes through increased ownership by citizens. 
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   Foreword to the UN Convention against Corruption https://www.un  
     odc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf 
71
   UNECA, Illicit Financial Flow: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit 
Financial Flows from Africa https://www.uneca.org/sites/default 
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